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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that real exchange rates (RER) behave dierently in devel-
oped and developing countries. We develop an exogenous 2-sector growth model in which
RER determination depends on the country's capacity to borrow from international capital
markets. The country faces a constraint on capital inows. With high domestic savings,
the country converges to the world per capita income and RER only depends on productiv-
ity spread between sectors (Balassa-Samuelson eect). If the constraint is too tight and/or
domestic savings too low, RER depends on both net foreign assets (transfer eect) and
productivity. We then analyze the empirical implications of the model and nd that, in
accordance with the theory, RER is mainly driven by productivity and net foreign assets in
constrained countries and exclusively by productivity in unconstrained countries.
JEL Classication: E39; F32; F41.
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11 Introduction
A recurrent question in International Macroeconomics concerns the main long-run determinants
of real exchange rates (RER). There is, however, no consensus yet on this question. Among
the most often quoted determinants we can nd productivity, terms of trade and net foreign
assets (NFA) [see Chinn (2006)]. Empirical evidence suggests that these determinants change
signicantly as we vary periods and countries considered.
The empirical literature on the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) eect shows that RER appreciation
may be related to productivity growth but not systematically. It seems to have special relevance
for countries like Japan, some OECD countries [Canzoneri et al. (1999)] and transition economies
[ Egert et al 2003, 2006]. Ito et al. (1999) show that RER and growth are positively correlated
in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong whereas the correlation remains negative for Indonesia,
Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and China. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore combine a
high growth rate and a small appreciation. For other Asian countries except China, Singapore,
Taiwan and Thailand, Chinn (2000a) nds that productivity explains RER only when public
spending and oil prices are taken into account. Chinn (2000b), using panel data, nds that
the RER requires around 5 years to converge to the level predicted by BS. In a recent paper,
Bergin et al (2006) also report that the BS eect is not stable through time, but it appears to
have become more important in recent years. The t of the standard BS theory to explain RER
changes seems to be very poor and largely country- and period-specic.
Recently, in line with the theory that emphasises the role of foreign assets for equilibrium
RERs, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) have developed a model that highlights the transfer eect
- which relates RER to NFA. Using a database that covers 64 industrial and less developed
countries between 1970 and 1998, they show that a rise in NFA appreciates the RER, especially
for countries that have low income, low openness or foreign exchange restrictions. The theoretical
model they present links international payment to RER through an adjustment of labor supply1.
However, they fall short of explaining why developing countries that face a constraint on capital
inows experiment a higher transfer eect than others.
Linking together this diverse set of results, our study contributes to this literature in two
1Obstfeld and Rogo (1995), Galstyan (2007) also develop models in which international payments aects the
relative price of the non-traded good through a labor supply adjustment.
2ways. First, it presents a model that reconciles these empirical ndings in which RER determi-
nation depends on the country's capacity to borrow from international capital markets. Second,
it tests whether the behavior of the data is consistent with the main results of the model focusing
on whether the long- and short-run relationships between the RER and its main determinants
depend on the nancial constraints faced by countries.
Although not our primary focus, the paper is also related to the growth and convergence
literature. Our model stresses that a RER appreciation may help a developing country catching-
up with the world per capita income. Indeed, because of the way the constraint is specied,
a RER appreciation attracts capital ows2 and may ll in a lack of domestic savings that
accelerates growth temporarily or increases permanently long-run income per capita. Some
models with constraints on capital inows have already been developed in the exogenous growth
literature [Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Lane (2001)]. They exhibit a common
property: the constraint on capital inows slows down economic convergence but does not stop
it. The convergence speed they obtained is empirically plausible [Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992)] while it was not the case in closed economy models. In the long-run, however, per capita
income of the developing country systematically converges to the world per capita income: the
developing country is no longer constrained in steady state. In contrast, by making use of
overlapping generations, our model allows the steady state to be constrained or unconstrained.
The credit constraint we impose can not only slow down absolute convergence but also prevent
it from occurring even in the long-run. This model then predicts convergence clubs rather than
absolute convergence: a developing country with lack of domestic savings or unstable institutions
may not converge even in the long-run - since it reaches a constrained steady state with lower
income per capita.3
We use an overlapping generations setting of a constrained economy initially developed
by Obstfeld and Rogo [1996] in which we introduce two production sectors [Gente, 2006]
a non-traded and a traded sector. We assume that the amount the country can borrow on
the international capital market is an exogenous fraction of per-capita income. This fraction
2In Rodrick (2007), capital inows are related to traded inputs and a real appreciation also increases capital
inows as in our model.
3Bosworth and Collins (2003), amongst others, have provided evidence in favor of such type of convergence
and against absolute convergence. See also Durlauf et al (2005) for further discussion.
3represents the trust of foreign investors about local institutions, creditworthiness, and the ease of
cross-border nancial transactions. If the constraint is not too tight - or if there are high domestic
savings - the constrained economy will become unconstrained in the long-run. Otherwise, if
investors are not condent - or there are low domestic savings - the developing country will
converge to the constrained steady state. The RER behaviour diers widely between those two
kinds of steady states.
In the unconstrained steady state, the RER will exclusively be determined by the Balassa-
Samuelson eect. Conversely, in the constrained steady state, the RER will depend on supply
and demand of non-traded goods. A productivity shock operates through a demand eect and
not only through the Balassa-Samuelson eect. In the same way, an international transfer from
abroad will appreciate the RER whereas this is not the case in the unconstrained steady state.
This transfer eect is higher in less open economies. This is consistent with Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2004) empirical results. Assuming perfect mobility of factors between sectors, total
output depends on both capital intensity and RER. A RER appreciation as well as an increase
in savings relaxes the constraint and may promote convergence. Then a positive transfer from
abroad may increase permanently income per capita. Indeed, through a RER appreciation, the
transfer eect loosens the constraint. It then increases capital inows and helps the country
converging to a higher long-run per capita income, at the unconstrained steady state.
These implications of the model for the RER behavior are then tested using a simple econo-
metric model based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). We estimate separate RER models for
nancially constrained and unconstrained economies, selected using the Chinn and Ito (2007)
measure of external nancial openness. The ndings are supportive of the implications of the
model in the long-run, with the RER driven only by productivity in nancially open countries
and by both productivity and NFA for countries with restricted access to international nance.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theory model. Section 3 analyses
the steady state solution of the model for constrained and unconstrained economies. Section 4
presents the econometric evidence, and Section 5 provides some conclusions.
42 The model
The model is a variant of the small open economy overlapping generations model of Obstfeld
and Rogo (1996) in which we introduce two production sectors: a tradable sector and a non
tradable sector. In this setting, the real exchange rate R denotes the relative price of non
tradable to tradable goods. The country faces a constraint on capital inows
Bt+1   Ntyt (1)
where Bt+1 denotes the NFA of the domestic country in terms of traded goods, and  > 0
is the proportion of total income (Ntyt) the domestic country can borrow, where Nt is total
population and yt is per capita income. The  parameter reects the ease of access the country
has to international capital ows and may be related to institutional features such as restrictions
to capital and current account transactions4. The smaller  the more constrained the country
is to capital inows. In the model we present below, agents live for two periods and only work
in their rst period of life.
2.1 Individuals
The economy consists of a sequence of individuals who live for two periods. In the second period
of her life, each individual gives birth to 1 + n others so that the per period rate of population
growth is n. At time t, each generation consists of Nt identical individuals who make decisions
concerning consumption and savings.
The intertemporal preferences of an individual belonging to generation t are represented by
U (ct;dt+1) =  lnct + (1   )lndt+1 (2)
where ct and dt+1 are respectively composite consumption when adult and composite consump-
tion when old;  2 (0;1) denotes individuals' thrift.
Let x = c;d denote individual consumption at each period of life, and xN and xT be,
respectively, the spending allocated into non-traded and traded goods. Instantaneous preferences
4Our purpose in this paper is not to explain the  parameter or estimate it, but to emphasize the role that
this constraint can play in an open economy model.
5are dened according to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
u(xT;xN) = x
Tx1 
N , 0 <  < 1 (3)
Following Obstfeld and Rogo (1996), the small economy faces a constraint on capital inows
(Equation 1). The consequence of this assumption is that the domestic return on capital may be
higher than the world return. During the rst period of life, individuals oer labor inelastically
and allocate their net earnings wt among consumption spending tct and savings
tct + (1 + n)kt+1 + (1 + n)bt+1 = wt (4)
where kt+1 is total capital stock per young agent in terms of traded good prices kt+1 =
Kt+1=Nt+1, and bt+1 net foreign assets per young agent bt+1  Bt+1=Nt+1. The price of the trad-
able good is normalized at unity. We denote the composite consumption good by x  x
Tx1 
N
with x = c;d to specify the same preferences among the two goods for both periods and t the
consumer price index. Hence, national savings can be held into two forms, capital stock and
net foreign assets. Since the returns on these stocks are dierent, the agents choose both the
amount of their savings st and their allocation between the two assets kt+1 and bt+1. To take
into account this arbitrage, we assume, following Obstfeld and Rogo (1996), that the constraint
on capital inows holds at the microeconomic level. This assumption means that banks cannot
lend more than yt to each individual at the world market interest rate  r. Agents know both the
world and domestic returns on capital. A spread between these two returns is a new potential
source of income for them: they can borrow from the world market to lend on the domestic
market and realize a capital gain.






(1 + n)kt+1 + (1 +  r)(1 + n)bt+1 (5)
The domestic return on capital is the market interest rate rd
t+1 whereas the world return  r is
xed according to the small open economy assumption.
The maximization program of an individual born in period t is solved in two steps. First, the
individual chooses tct and bt+1 to maximize life-cycle utility (2) under the budget constraints





6Second, he shares his consumption spending (x) between the two goods xN and xT to maximize
instantaneous utility (3) under the spending constraint x = RxN + xT. Hence, the allocation
of total consumption spending between the two goods at each period is
xT = x
RxN = (1   )x
where the price index is  = ()R1 , with ()    (1   )
 1.
2.2 Production Sectors
Investment transforms instantaneously a unit of tradable good into a unit of installed capital:
Kt+1 = It and capital fully depreciates after one period ( = 1). The representative rm
produces in the two sectors, the traded (T) and the non-traded (N) sector.
Max
It;KTt;LTt
F (KTt;LTt) + RH (KNt;LNt)   wLt   It
s:t: Kt+1 = It
KTt + KNt = Kt (7)
LTt + LNt = Lt (8)
with Lt being total labor supply, and Ki and Li the amount of capital stock and labor supply
used in sector i = T;N respectively. F() and H() are the traded and non-traded sector
production functions. Dropping time indices, optimal allocation of factors is given by
aTf0 (kT) = aNRh0 (kN) (9)
aT





h(kN)   kNh0 (kN)

(10)
where ki  Ki=(liL) is capital intensity, and the share of labor used in sector i is li = Li=L;
i = T;N: The intensive form production functions are F (kT;1)  f (kT); H (kN;1)  h(kN).
Finally, ai is the total factor productivity level of sector i = T;N. According to (9) and (10), kN
and kT depend only on RER whereas the allocation of labor depends both on capital intensity
7and the RER. Hence, kN  kN (aT;aN;R) and kT  kT (aT;aN;R), while lN  lN (aT;aN;k;R)











f00aT (kN   kT)
Similarly, @lN=@k S 0 if kN S kT and @lN=@R > 0. When the tradable sector is capital
intensive, a real appreciation leads to an increase in both capital intensities kN and kT whereas
labor moves from the traded to the non-traded sector. These factor movements reect that a
real appreciation makes the non-tradable sector more attractive. Assuming perfect intersectoral
mobility, the returns on capital rd = aTf0 (kT (aT;aN;R))   1  rd (aT;aN;R) and labor w =
aT [f (kT (aT;aN;R))   f0 (kT (aT;aN;R))kT (aT;aN;R)]  w(aT;aN;R) only depend on the
RER (R) and productivity. A RER appreciation, protable to the non-traded sector which
is labor intensive, will increase wage and reduce the domestic interest rate. An exogenous
rise in traded (non-traded) sector productivity increases (decreases) domestic interest rates and
reduces (increases) wages when the traded sector is capital intensive. Unless otherwise slated,
we will omit the productivity terms (ai) when there is no productivity change so that: kT 
kT (R);kN  kN (R);lN  lN (k;R);rd  rd (k;R);w  w(k;R):
Per capita total income depends on both the RER and per capita capital stock: y 
 
1 + rd (R)

k + w  y (R;k) with
@y
@k
= 1 + rd (12)
@y
@R
= Rh(kN (R))lN (k;R) (13)
A RER appreciation and a rise in per capita capital stock both exert a positive eect on total
income.
2.3 The temporary equilibrium in the constrained case
We will focus on the case where the capital inows constraint binds, at least initially, with
a capital intensive traded sector. This creates a gap between domestic and world returns on
capital. This gap - in a similar way as a risk premium5 - reects the fact that many developing
5Similar results could potentially be obtained by considering country-risk.
8countries do not have full access to international capital markets: the return on domestic capital
rd
t+1 must be higher than the world market interest rate  r to oset the perceived risky return
due to, for instance, a restrictive capital account regime.
























Individuals consume a proportion  of their life-cycle income during the rst period of life and
the remaining in the second. Life-cycle income consists of:
- the wage w
- the capital gain agents may realize borrowing at world rate  r to invest in domestic capital
whose return rd is higher than  r:
The period-t temporary equilibrium conditions are
(i) Capital market equilibrium. Given the optimal intersectoral factor allocation kT (R)





Let  (Rt+1)  

rd (Rt+1)    r

1 + rd (Rt+1)
 1 be the arbitrage premium which depends on
the interest rate gap between domestic and world capital markets and on proportion  of the
income agents can borrow. The higher   the higher the capital gain agents realize. Therefore,
capital per worker is
kt+1 = [1    +     (Rt+1)]
w(Rt)
1 + n
+ [    (Rt+1)]
1 + rd (Rt)
1 + n
kt (17)
(ii) Labor market equilibrium. The inelastic labor supply Nt is equal to the labor demand
Lt. Given the capital market equilibrium, the wage w equalizing labor supply and demand is
dened by
w(Rt)  f (kT (Rt))   kT (Rt)f0 (kT (Rt)) (18)
(iii) Non-tradable goods market equilibrium. There are Nt young agents and Nt 1 old
agents. Hence, the equilibrium on the non tradable goods market is
(1   )(Nttct + Nt 1tdt) = RtYN (Rt;kt) (19)
9with YN (Rt;kt)  lN (Rt;kt)Nth(kN (Rt)): Consumption spending is given by equations (14)
and (15).
Equation (17) describes the allocation of saving between both assets. It oers a rst dynamic
relationship between the RER and capital intensity. Using (16), (18) and (19), with consumption
spending given by (14) and (15), we get a second dynamic relationship between R and k.
The intuition behind the dynamics is the following. In such a constrained economy, the
amount the country can borrow on world market is limited to a =(1 + n) fraction of the
global income. In this 2-sector 2-factor model, global income does not only depend on capital
intensity but also depends on RER. A RER appreciation - or an increase in capital intensity -
increases total income in terms of traded good and then loosens the constraint. The country
can borrow more, increases its capital stock and total output, loosening the constraint again.
This mechanism will help the country converging to an unconstrained steady state if non-traded
consumption is suciently high and if the constraint is not too tight (if  not too small).
Otherwise the country will remain constrained in the long-run6.
In the existing literature, there are constrained economy models like Barro, Mankiw and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) or Lane (2001) that focused on the convergence speed issue. Indeed, in
those constrained economy models the country systematically converges to an unconstrained
steady state and the point is to know at what speed. In our model, the country may converge
in the long-run to a steady state that could either be constrained or unconstrained7. Hence, the
important question here is to study the relationship between NFA and RER in both types of
equilibrium.
6When the tradable sector is labor intensive, it is the RER depreciation that helps the country converge to an
unconstrained steady state. We do not focus on this case in what follows because it is less frequently observed
and corresponds to a preliminary stage of development [Ito, Isard and Symanski (1999)].
7This is due to the presence of overlapping generations and the fact that there is no need for the time preference
rate to equalize the world interest rate.
103 Steady state
There are two kinds of steady state: a constrained one and an unconstrained one. However, these
two steady states do not exist simultaneously8. The country may converge to an unconstrained
steady state if the constraint is not to severe (high ), domestic saving is high (low ) or if
agents consume enough non-traded goods (low ). The relationship between RER, NFA and
productivity depends on the kind of steady state the economy converges to.
3.1 Constrained or unconstrained?
We now aim at determining the threshold level of the constraint, ~  such that if  < ~ ; the country
will remain constrained in the long-run (see Appendix B). We will then proceed into three stages.
First, we describe the constrained steady state. Second, we describe the unconstrained steady
state Then we determine the threshold level of the constraint ~ .
3.1.1 A constrained steady state
The constrained steady state is denoted by a : If the country remains constrained even in the




(1   ) +     (R)











rd (R)    r







Equation (20) gives the long-run allocation of saving. In this constrained economy, capital
per capita k is nanced by domestic saving plus capital inows. Equation (21) is the long-
run non-traded good market clearing condition. Both long-run capital intensity and RER
are determined by those two conditions. Then, the constraint gives net foreign assets: b =
 y (R;k)=(1 + n):
8We can show, using a simple Cobb-Douglas example, that, when the unconstrained steady state exists, the
constraint is no longer respected and then the constrained steady state does not exist.
9To guarantee potential existence, we assume that  < (1 + n)=(1 +  r).
113.1.2 An unconstrained steady state
An overbar denotes the unconstrained steady state. It is the standard steady state that occurs
in a two-sector two-factor small open economy model. The developing country has a perfect
access to the international capital market so that
rd    R

=  r (22)
That is, domestic return on capital converges to the world one. Equation (22) determines the
long-run RER that depends only on the world interest rate10. The long-run RER determines the
wage and hence the demand for non-traded goods (left hand side of equation (23)). Domestic
capital  k clears the non-traded good market

 +


















(1   )    k (24)
In this unconstrained steady state, the Balassa-Samuelson analysis holds since RER only
depends on the supply side of the model.
3.1.3 The threshold level
The level of the constraint, , is exogenous and could be interpreted as the penalty imposed by
international investors to a country because of lack of creditworthiness and institutional restric-
tions to nancial ows. We take this penalty as given and determine whether this  penalty
is severe enough to allow the developing country to converge to the unconstrained steady state.
We focus on the case where k0 <  k: Let ~  be the threshold level of the constraint such that
- when   ~ ; the country converges to the unconstrained steady state and we recover the
standard small open economy setting
- when  < ~ , the country converges to the constrained steady state and remains constrained
in the long-run.
10The RER is also determined eventually here by the productivity spread between sectors as well:
r
d (aN;aT;R) =  r with @r
d=@aN < 0;@r
d=@aT > 0 when the traded sector is capital intensive.
12A special case of this model would be  = 0 where the country would be so constrained that
net foreign assets would be zero. This case would correspond to a closed economy setting.
A rise (drop) in ~  makes the convergence to the (unconstrained) constrained steady state
more likely to occur. We can characterize the threshold level ~  in a simple Cobb-Douglas case.
Example: The Cobb-Douglas case. We assume Cobb-Douglas technologies in both sectors.
Let the long-run propensity to consume the non-traded good be
	 = (1   )[ + (1   )(1 +  r)=(1 + n)]
After a bit of algebra (see Appendix B) we can show that
~  =
1+n
1+ r [ + 	(   )]   (1   )(1   )
1 + 	(   )
Where  and  are the elasticities of output with respect to capital in the traded and
non-traded sectors respectively. We assume that the total propensity to consume the non-
traded good 	 is lower than unity and that the traded sector is capital intensive. This
means that 1 + 	(   ) > 0: This implies that a rise in 	 promotes convergence to
the unconstrained steady state11. The intuition behind this result is simply that a rise
in non-traded goods consumption tends to appreciate the RER. This RER appreciation
relaxes the constraint and helps the country reaching the unconstrained steady state. In
the same way, the threshold level ~  depends on n and  since population growth and time
preference inuence both propensity to consume 	 and savings.12
Calibration. We assume that half of the consumption is spent on non-traded goods. Assuming
that each generation lives for 25 years, the world interest factor is 1+ r = 0:37 which means
that the world real interest rate is about 1.25% per year, and n = 0:6 corresponds to a rate
of population growth of 1.9%. In accordance with Beine et al. (2001), let  = 0:6 to have
a domestic rate of time preference of around 3.56%. Using those gures, the threshold
level is ~  = 0:129. Figure 1 represents the long-run equilibrium. The constrained steady
state is represented for  = 0:1 and the unconstrained steady state for  = 0:2: In the
constrained steady state, the domestic real interest rate exceeds the world interest rate
11Since  < (1 + n)=(1 +  r), we have @~ =@	 < 0:
12For instance, we have that @~ =@n > 0:
13and more resources are allocated to the production of the traded good. Since domestic
interest rate and RER are negatively related, the RER is lower in the constrained steady
state than in the unconstrained one. We choose the elasticities of output with respect to
capital per capita for the two sectors to match empirical evidence: 40% of total output is
traded with 37% of labor being employed in that sector [Mahbub Morshed and Turnovsky
(2004)]. With  = 0:4 and  = 0:2 the traded sector is capital intensive. Then, we have
l
T = 39:24% and  lT = 37:70% whereas y
T=y = 43:51% and  yT= y = 41:62% (See Table 1).
In the constrained steady state, production factors are over-allocated in the traded sector.
[Figure 1]
[Table 1]
3.2 NFA and RER
The relationship between NFA and RER, the so-called transfer eect, will depend on the nature
of the steady state the economy converges to. Let Tt denote a transfer received from abroad.
Then capital market equilibrium becomes
st + Tt = (1 + n)[bt+1 + kt+1]
We can consider T as a gift from foreigners. Like savings, this gift will be used for asset
accumulation.
3.2.1 Unconstrained steady state
Long-run equilibrium is given by equations (23) and (22). The introduction of the transfer
changes NFA accumulation





(1   )    k (25)
A transfer will increase NFA. Since RER is exclusively determined by productivity and world
interest rates: there is no transfer eect and NFA do not aect the RER.
143.2.2 Constrained steady state
In the constrained steady state, long-run equilibrium is given by equations (20) and (21) and




The introduction of the transfer T changes equation (20) that becomes
k =
w(R)










A transfer will have two kinds of eects
(i) a direct eect: a rise in T increases capital intensity. Since the non-traded sector is labor
intensive, this rise in capital reduces non-traded output and leads to a RER appreciation.
(ii) an indirect eect: a transfer increases total production and loosens the constraint. As
a result, capital stock increases more and this reinforces the RER appreciation. The higher 
- the more the country is allowed to borrow on international markets - the higher the RER
appreciation.
As in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), the transfer eect increases with the size of the
non-traded sector: the less open (low ) the country, the higher the direct eect. However, our
model shows analytically that the transfer eect depends also on the country's access to external
borrowing. It holds only in the constrained economy case, that is, when  < ~ : Conversely, when
  ~  the transfer eect does not hold.
Calibration: The transfer eect An international transfer can be considered as an exoge-
nous increase in savings. Figure 2 depicts the consequences of a transfer on steady state.
The transfer shifts the (CM) curve to the North. In the unconstrained steady state, it does
not aect domestic interest rate -because the equilibrium lies at the intersection between
(WIR) and (CM). In the constrained steady state, the domestic interest rate increases
and more resources are allocated to the production of the non-traded good. It follows
that in this case, RER appreciates whereas RER is not aected by the transfer in the
unconstrained steady state13.
[Figure 2]
13 The transfer also relaxes the constraint moving the equilibrium to the West part of the Figure. If the transfer
is high enough, it can help the constrained economy reaching an unconstrained steady state.
153.3 RER and Productivity
In this 2x2 model global output increases not only with capital intensity but also with RER
appreciation [See equations (12) and (13)]. However, the relationship between RER and output
still depends on the nature of the steady state the economy converges to.
3.3.1 Unconstrained steady state
The long-run equilibrium is given by equations (23) and (24). The RER is exclusively determined
by the world interest rate and productivity spread between sectors according to
rd (aT;aN;R) =  r (26)
with @rd=@aT > 0. An increase in traded productivity will directly generate a RER appreciation
(Balassa-Samuelson eect). Then, this RER appreciation leads to a rise in output: the higher
the saving rate and population growth, the higher the output rise.
3.3.2 Constrained steady state








(1   ) +     (aT;R)
1   (    (aT;R))
1+rd(aT;R)
1+n
with @w=@aT < 0 and @rd=@aT > 0;@ =@aT > 0: The constraint always binds so that NFA
are determined by output. The Balassa-Samuelson theory does not hold here in the sense that
equation (22) no longer applies. The RER does not only depend on productivity and world
interest rate but instead results from the interaction between demand and supply of non-traded
output. A rise in traded goods productivity aT leads to changes in both demand and supply of
non-traded goods and will generate:
(i) an ambiguous eect on non-traded goods demand14 due to a rise in domestic return on
capital combined with a wage decrease.
14With a simulation exercise, we can show that, in the large majority of cases, demand for non-traded goods
will decrease.
16(ii) a decrease in non-traded output
(iii) an ambiguous eect on global output
The third eect will aect the country's capacity to borrow on international markets. A
rise in total output will relax the constraint, increase capital stock, and decrease non-traded
output. Conversely, a decrease in total output will tighten the constraint, reducing capital stock
and increasing non-traded output. Since this third eect is ambiguous, the relationship between
traded productivity and RER is dicult to characterize in this constrained steady state. For
economies with high rate of time preference and/or not allowed to borrow enough on interna-
tional markets, the Balassa-Samuelson eect may be reversed: a rise in traded productivity may
lead to a RER depreciation. Otherwise (high  and/or high ), the RER still appreciates as
in the unconstrained case but operating here through a demand eect and not only through a
productivity, channel as in the unconstrained case. It is hence possible that productivity can
have an ambiguous eect on the RER for nancially constrained countries.
4 Econometric tests
We now present empirical evidence on the determinants of the RER in order to analyze the main
conclusions from the theory model presented in the previous section. We rst estimate the long-
run (steady state) solution of the model by analyzing the long-run cointegration vector for the
RER and its main determinants and split the sample according to the degree of restrictiveness to
foreign capital. We then estimate a system Error Correction Model (ECM) where we can analyze
causal relationships between the variables. It is worth noting that, far from being a direct test of
the model, we aim at analyzing whether its main conclusions are reected in the behavior of the
RER data. Throughout our analysis, we make use of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2007)
dataset, which we match with the Chinn-Ito (2007) index of nancial openness (KOPENt) as
will be explained below. Our data set comprises 55 countries for the period 1970-1998.
We estimate an equilibrium (log) real eective exchange rate (LREERt) equation where we
consider relative productivity (proxied by log-relative per-capita income LY Dt) and net foreign
assets as a percentage of GDP (NFAt) as the main steady state determinants of the RER. This
specication is derived from equations (26) (20) (21) that determined long-run RER. Following
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), we also consider the (log) terms of trade (LTTt) as a control
17variable. The equation takes the form:
LREERit = 1LY Dit + 2NFAit + 3LTTit + "it (27)
where "it is a random iid normally distributed error and j are the estimated long-run coecients.
We estimated the equation using a panel modied version of the Dynamic-OLS estimator.
Following Phillips and Loretan (1991), we augmented the regression not only with leads and lags
of the variables, but also with lags of the residuals. This estimator, which behaves equivalently
to a Maximum Likelihood estimator, is not only ecient but ensures that the parameters are
normally distributed. In our application, given the yearly nature of the data, we used one lag
(and lead) augmentation15.
Given our interest on the impact of external nancial access on the determination of the
RER, we need to split the sample into constrained and unconstrained economies according to
an observable indicator. We pay special attention to this issue as it is central to interpreting the
results of the empirical model. In principle, a variety of variables could be used as indicators
of the degree of nancial access of countries in international markets. One such variable is the
level of income. However, this is a very imperfect proxy for nancial access as we can have rich
countries with restrictive capital account practices and vice versa. This would aect the sample
splitting exercise precisely for countries close to the splitting threshold. Another such measure
is the ratio of NFA to GDP. This is a de facto measure that shows the exposure of a country to
capital ows. However, this measure also presents an important disadvantage. Our interest is on
whether the country is a priori restricted by the international capital markets. Countries that
are unconstrained could have very dierent levels of external indebtedness depending on whether
their relative prices and domestic interest rates are close to the world ones. We could hence
observe countries with low NFA to GDP ratios due to either fundamental economic reasons or
nancial constraints.
Another variable that could be used to separate constrained and unconstrained countries is
the real interest rate. A clear implication of nancial constraints, as discussed in Section 2.3, is
that it introduces a wedge between domestic and world returns to capital. However, reliable data
on nominal interest rates and ination for instruments with similar maturities is not available
15The results from using a DOLS estimator as proposed in Kao and Chiang (2001) are very similar.
18for our sample of countries.16 The problems with these data are multiple. For many countries,
data is simply not reported or is available only for a few years of the sample (or, in some cases,
discontinued). This makes it impossible to compare real rates across countries for similar sample
periods. Another important problem is that real interest rates for some developing countries are
extremely volatile due to processes of hyperination.
For this reason, we prefer to use alternative measures of access to international capital ows
based on de jure classications. One such measure is the capital openness index (KOPENt)
developed by Chinn and Ito (2007). This is an index that measures the extent of openness
in capital account transactions of an economy. It is based on the rst standardized principal
component of a series of binary variables accounting for the presence of multiple exchange
rates, capital account transaction restrictions, current account transactions restrictions and the
appropriation of export proceeds. Low values indicate high capital account restrictions and
hence constraints on the access to international nance. The higher the KOPENt index, the
more open the country is to international capital ows. Quinn and Toyoda (2008) discuss
dierent measures of capital account liberalization and also develop their own indexes based on
Quinn (1997). Both of their measures are highly correlated with KOPENt and produce similar
country rankings. Given that KOPENt comprises a larger number of countries matching the
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti dataset, we prefer to use KOPENt for our sample splitting.
In order to obtain an optimal sample split, we used the methodology developed by Hansen
(2000) based on threshold estimation. It would be desirable to obtain a sample split for the whole
panel data. However, threshold sample splitting techniques for nonstationary variables are not
available in the literature. For this reason we applied the sample splitting method on a cross-
sectional estimate where we regress the rst dierence of LREER on the rst dierence of the
independent variables. In order to avoid problems of initial and nal anomalous observations,
the rst dierence is dened as the dierence between the average value of the variable for
1985-1998 and the average for 1970-1984. The threshold variable used is the average value of
KOPENt throughout the sample period for each country.17 It is worth noting, though, that
16Reliable data are usually available precisely after periods of internal and external nancial liberalisation,
which would obviously introduce a sample selection bias if we were to use only countries where comparable real
interest rate data is available.
17We also used the initial value of KOPENt as a threshold variable. However, it was only marginally signicant
19splitting the sample arbitrarily between countries with positive and negative average KOPENt
values gave similar results. The results from the sample splitting tests are reported in Table 218.
[Table 2]
We report the value of the threshold of KOPENt for sample splitting, the LM test for the
null of no threshold (no sample split) and its bootstrapped p-value, and the number of countries
in each regime. These show that KOPENt is a signicant variable for sample splitting and the
split point is at a value of -0.53. Figure 3 shows the recursive Likelihood Ratio test as a function
of the threshold, variable, which is minimized at -0.53. The list of countries in each group is
reported in Appendix A.19
[Figure 3]
We then proceed to the estimation of the long-run cointegration vector for both sub-samples
of countries. All the variables were checked for stationarity and the I(1) specication could not
be rejected. In testing for unit roots, we used the IPS and Maddala-Wu panel unit root tests.
We then proceeded to test for cointegration using LREERt, NFAt, and LY Dt as dependent
variables in the cointegration vector. Table 3 presents the results from the group-ADF test
and delivered a very uneven split between countries. Using the average value of KOPENt for 1970-1984, though,
resulted in very similar results to those reported in the paper in terms of the countries comprising the group of
constrained and unconstrained economies.
18Despite their obvious disadvantages, we also experimented with other variables. We used NFAt and per
capita income ypc. The results from the LM tests for the existence of a threshold could not reject the null of no
threshold.
19In order to further our previous point about the use of real interest rates, we calculated sample averages
and standard deviations of real interest rates for the countries and periods available from IMF's IFS database.
These real rates are not reliable as they include dierent instruments and maturities, they were only available
for 41 countries and, for many of them, they do not run for the whole sample period. The data, available on
request, shows that the average real rate for the group of constrained economies is much higher than that of
unconstrained ones classied using the KOPENt index. If we drop Argentina and Brazil from the sample, due
to their unusually high nominal and real interest rates during some hyperination periods, the real interest rate
continues to be higher than in the unconstrained group, albeit the dierence is much smaller. However, the
average standard deviation (standard deviation for each country averaged across countries within the group)
is much higher regardless of whether we drop Argentina and Brazil from the sample. This indicates that the
classication based on KOPENt may also be correlated with the level and volatility of real interest rates in this
group of countries.
20of Pedroni (1999)20 and shows that only the equations using LREERt as dependent variable
constitute long-run equilibrium relations.
[Table 3]




The results for the whole sample show a positive relationship of the three variables considered
with the RER. This is similar to the results in Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2004), but in our case
relative income appears to have an insignicant eect. The results, though, are not directly
comparable due to dierences in the sample of countries. The results from the sample splitting
show that for unconstrained economies only LY D and LTT appear as signicant long-run deter-
minants of the RER. Conversely, for constrained economies, NFA becomes strongly signicant,
and LY D appears to have a negative impact on the RER. This lends support to the theoretical
hypothesis that NFA is only important for constrained economies and YD is the main driver of
RER for unconstrained economies (see Subsections 3.2 and 3.3). In the model, the transfer eect
(positive eect from NFA to RER) holds only in constrained economies whereas the Balassa-
Samuelson eect (positive eect of YD on RER) always holds in unconstrained economies. For
the more constrained economies, the Balassa-Samuelson eect may be reversed, with a rise in
YD causing a drop in RER. The long-run estimated vectors lend support for these hypotheses.
Using the estimated long-run vectors, we then proceed to estimate error correction models
(ECMs) for each of the variables involved, treating LTT as strictly exogenous. Given the well
known bias of the OLS estimator for dynamic stationary panels, we estimated the ECMs by
system GMM. We used as instruments the second and third lags of the variables and the lagged
level21. The results are reported in Tables 7 to 9, where we show the coecients and their
p-values and a J-test for over-identifying restrictions. In all cases the J-test indicated that the
20We also checked for cointegration using the panel ADF test and the group and panel PP tests proposed in
Pedroni (1999). The results are invariant to extracting group means to account for cross-sectional correlation.
21The results are invariant to the inclusion of the lag level.
21system is overidentied. The coecient on the ECM indicates whether or not the cointegration
vector is a long-run attractor and hence can be used to test for causality as is the case with the




The results for unconstrained economies (Table 8) indicate that, in the long-run, only the RER
adjusts to the equilibrium relationship with its determinants, indicating that these are weakly
exogenous and supporting the existence of just one cointegration relationship. The adjustment
speed is found to be low, with 16% per year. In the short run, relative income causes the RER
and NFA causes relative income. Finally, NFA also appears to be positively aected by LY D
indicating a two-way causality between these variables in the short-run. From the point of view
of the theory model, this is partially supportive since in unconstrained economies (i) RER is
caused by productivity; (ii) NFA are caused by income and savings; (iii) Income is caused by
capital intensity, and capital intensity results from domestic savings and NFA.
For constrained economies (Table 9) the error correction coecients display very similar
values to those of the unconstrained ones. This again indicates that the determinants of the
RER are weakly exogenous. In the short run, we nd that NFA have a positive impact on
relative income and the RER a negative one. Income also appears to cause NFA in the short
run with a positive sign.
We analyzed further the results to check for the possibility that they are sensitive to the
inclusion of some countries in the sample. The robustness of our ndings was tested using a
cross-validation approach. We assume a function:
it(xit;zit;) = uit i 2 [1;N];t 2 [1;T] (28)
where xit is the vector of endogenous variables; zit is the vector of exogenous variables; it is a
vector function representing the estimated cointegration functional form or the EC model;  are
the estimated parameters, and uit is the error term. Denote by b (i 1) the estimate of  obtained
when we omit country i 2 [1;N] from the sample. In this case, b (i 1) is the cross-validated
22estimate of  when we omit country i = 1;:::;N. This procedure allows us to check for correct
statistical inference, especially when the number of cross-sections is small.
We analyzed the robustness of all the long-run estimated coecients in both panels as well
as the robustness of the error corretion term in the ECM. The estimates remained remarkably
stable throughout, which further conrms the advantages of our sample split as no further
parameter instability arising from the cross-section appears to be present in the model. Figures
4-1 and 4-2 present the estimated coecient (denoted by a diamond) for the panel when we
drop each one of the countries plus-minus one standard error (denoted by the vertical bar).
[Figure 4-1]
[Figure 4-2]
For reasons of space we only present the coecients of the long-run vector for NFAit and Y Dit,
but the other coecients, including the one for the ECM, also show the same stable pattern. We
can easily see that dropping any of the countries does not produce a substantial change in the
estimated coecients and their signicance. Any changes are of a small order of magnitude, both
statistically and economically, and do not change the conclusions regarding the determinants of
the RER in nancially constrained and unconstrained economies.
5 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that signicant real exchange rate (RER) determinants change as
we vary periods and countries considered. We develop an overlapping generations two-factor
two-sector model of a small open economy in which the way RER is determined varies with
the country's capacity to borrow on international markets. We assume that the country faces
a constraint on capital inows. A special feature of the model, and in contrast to the existing
literature, is that the steady state can either be constrained or unconstrained. The way capital,
net foreign assets (NFA) and real exchange rate are determined depends on the nature of the
steady state. In the unconstrained steady state, the RER only depends on productivity spread
between sectors - a Balassa-Samuelson eect. In the constrained steady state, the RER does
not only depend on productivity but also on the determinants of savings and net foreign assets
(transfer eect).
23We then study the implications of the model using econometric evidence on the determi-
nants of the RER for nancially constrained and unconstrained economies. We split the sample
endogenously using the Chinn and Ito (2007) capital account openness variable as an index
of external nancial constraints. Our results lend support for the theoretical implications of
the model: the RER appears to be mainly driven by productivity and NFA in countries that
face foreign exchange restrictions and exclusively by productivity in countries that have perfect
access to the international capital market.
24APPENDIX
A Samples
We split the whole sample into the two following sub-sample:
 Low Kaopen: France, Norway, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Turkish, South
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobaggo, Sri Lanka,
Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Morocco, Tunisia, India,
Pakistan.
 High Kaopen: USA, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden,
switzerland, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Bolivia, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia.
B Calculation of ~ 
Under what conditions will the domestic interest rate rd converge to the world one? Will
domestic saving be enough to drive k to  k given the borrowing constraint?
Let ~ k denote the steady state capital per capita obtained in the constrained steady state
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= 0: Then the critical level of the constrained ~  is such that ~ k =  k. Let the
production functions be
f (kT) = k
T; 0 <  < 1 (30)
h(kN) = k

N 0 <  < 1 (31)
Let 	 = (1   )[ + (1   )(1 +  r)=(1 + n)] denote the aggregate propensity to consume the
non-traded good. Then, using k = (1   lN)kT + lNkN; the convenient Cobb-Douglas specica-
25tion and equations (23) and (29) the critical level of the constraint ~  is given by
~  =
1+n
1+ r [ + 	(   )]   (1   )(1   )
1 + 	(   )
(32)
We can also calculate ~  when there is a transfer in the long-run. The temporary equilibrium in
the constrained case becomes, with the transfer,
kt+1 = [1    +     (Rt+1)]
w(Rt)
1 + n
+ (    (Rt+1))





with T a constant per-period per-capita transfer:
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The unconstrained steady state capital stock  k is unchanged and then we can calculate ~  such
that ~ k =  k
~  =
1+n
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Table 1: Calibration 
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Table 2: Sample splitting results using KOPEN index and sample averages of 
variables 
Threshold estimate  -0.53 
95% Confidence Interval  [-0.75 -0.06] 
LM test  11.62 
Bootstrapped p-value  0.06 
No. countries Regime 1 (KOPEN>threshold)  22 
No. countries Regime 2 (KOPEN<threshold)  33 
Notes: The table shows the results from the Hansen (2000) threshold method for sample splitting. The 
threshold variable is KOPEN from Ito and Chinn (2007). The bootstrapped CVs were obtained using 1,500 
bootstrap draws. 
 
Table 3: Panel cointegration tests, Group-ADF statistics 
Dep. Variable  Whole sample 
LREERt  -2.63*** 
LYDt  -0.51 
NFAt  0.65 
 Panel  A  (KOPEN>-0.53) 
LREERt  -1.84* 
LYDt  0.54 
NFAt  3.88 
 Panel  B  (KOPEN<-0.53) 
LREERt  -1.97** 
LYDt  -0.74 
NFAt  -1.58 
Note: (***), (**) and (*) show rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1%, 5% and 10% 











Table 4: Long-run cointegration vector. Whole sample.  
Dependent variable: LREER 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P-value 
LYD 0.044  0.039  [.265] 
NFA 0.320  0.028  [.000] 







Table 5: Long-run cointegration vector. Unconstrained economies.  
Dependent variable: LREER 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P-value 
LYD 0.477  0.048  [.000] 
NFA 0.021  0.035  [.549] 






Table 6: Long-run cointegration vector. Constrained economies.  
Dependent variable: LREER 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error  P-value 
LYD -0.177  0.043  [.000] 
NFA 0.482  0.033  [.000] 






Table 7: GMM estimation of the system ECM model. Whole sample. 
  Eq for  t LREER Δ  Eq  for  t LYD Δ  Eq  for  t NFA Δ  
1 − Δ t LREER   0.284 [.004]  -0.107 [.015]  -0.015 [.330] 
1 t LTT − Δ   0.027 [.265]  0.011 [.685]  0.026 [.001] 
1 t LYD − Δ   0.122 [.164]  -0.108 [.162]  0.565 [.000] 
1 t NFA − Δ   -0.044 [.321]  0.559 [.001]  0.048 [.007] 
1 − t ECM   -0.151 [.000]  0.018 [.191]  0.003 [.617] 
R
2  0.071 0.153  0.055 
J-test [p-val]  18.87 [0.22] 
Notes: numbers in brackets [] are p-values of the coefficients. The J-test is a test for over-identification 




Table 8: GMM estimation of the system ECM model. Unconstrained economies. 
  Eq for  t LREER Δ  Eq  for  t LYD Δ  Eq  for  t NFA Δ  
1 − Δ t LREER   -0.060 [.629]  -0.041 [.350]  0.001 [.954] 
1 t LTT − Δ   0.074 [.009]  -0.007 [.844]  0.011 [.328] 
1 t LYD − Δ   0.412 [.001]  0.028 [.781]  0.344 [.004] 
1 t NFA − Δ   0.072 [.095]  0.512 [.005]  0.029 [.292] 
1 − t ECM   -0.159 [.000]  -0.009 [.754]  0.002 [.872] 
R
2  0.099 0.179  0.092 
J-test [p-val]  18.99 [0.21] 
Note: see Table 4. 
 
 
Table 9: GMM estimation of the system ECM model. Constrained economies. 
  Eq for  t LREER Δ  Eq  for  t LYD Δ  Eq  for  t NFA Δ  
1 − Δ t LREER   0.357 [.007]  -0.215 [.000]  -0.012 [.531] 
1 t LTT − Δ   0.004 [.912]  -0.048 [.118]  0.029 [.008] 
1 t LYD − Δ   0.024 [.829]  -0.292 [.005]  0.663 [.000] 
1 t NFA − Δ   -0.039 [.540]  0.922 [.000]  0.043 [.084] 
1 − t ECM   -0.159 [.000]  0.027 [.128]  0.004 [.616] 
R
2  0.049 0.126  0.045 
J-test [p-val]  15.95 [0.38] 



























Figure 1: Calibration of Steady-State 
The loci (CM) and (NTM) depict, respectiveley, the capital market and non-traded good market equilibria. 
The locus (WIR) is the world interest factor.



























Figure 2: The transfer effect 
The loci (CM0) and (NTM) depict, respectiveley, the initial capital market and non-traded good market equilibria.
The locus (CM1) depicts the capital market equilibrium after a 0.5% rise in the Transfer.
The locus (WIR) is the world interest factor.


































Figures 4: sensitivity analysis. 
 





































































Figure 4-2: Beta coefficients sensitivity analysis, low KOPEN 
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